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Abstract 
 
We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder 
licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the 
licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the 
innovation’s value, and their period-1 output may signal that value. We find that two 
licensees are more likely to be preferred under asymmetric information with signaling than 
under symmetric information. 
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1. Introduction 
Consider a non-producer upstream patent holder that is obliged to sell licenses of an 
innovation (to one or several downstream firms). The literature has shown that, if the 
downstream firms have private information about the market value of the innovation, then 
more licenses may be sold by the patent holder than when the  upstream patent holder knows 
the downstream firms’ types; see, for instance, Schmitz (2002, 2007). We argue in this paper 
that a related result can be obtained within a signaling framework. 
We build a two-period signaling game of licensing in which each potential user of an 
innovation owned by the patent holder has private information about the effect  of the 
innovation on production costs (which can take one of two possible values, high or low), and 
where licensees can use their period-1 production as a signal. If two licenses are granted then 
the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We also assume that payments for 
each license are formed by the per-period expected profit of each firm.  
Under incomplete but symmetric information about how the cost of production of each 
licensee is affected by the innovation, the existence of a monopoly (or a duopoly) in the 
downstream market depends on the trade-off between two well-known sampling and rent 
dissipation effects. On one hand, issuing more licenses makes it more likely that there will be 
a low-cost licensee; on the other hand, more licenses reduce the licensor’s expected profits by 
increasing market competition. Which effect dominates depends on (i) the difference between 
high- and low cost of production and (ii) the probability of licensees being low-cost type.  
Here we show that, under asymmetric information, there is also a signaling effect giving 
informational rents to the downstream firms. In order to minimize the fee paid to the patent 
holder in period 2, a single downstream user would signal itself to the (upstream) patent 
holder as a high-cost producer by reducing its first-period output. When there are two users, 
however, Cournot competition also induces a “horizontal” incentive in each licensee to signal 
a low production cost to the rival. We find that, in the Bayesian separating equilibrium of 
least cost, competition (i.e., the issuing of two licenses) in the downstream market occurs 
within a range of parameters—the difference between high and low realization of production 
costs and the probability of being a low-cost user—for which only one license would be 
issued under symmetric information. Competition in the downstream market allows the 
upstream patent holder to reduce in period 1 the informational rents paid to the licensees. 
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Licensing under asymmetric information has been addressed extensively in the literature. 
However, the focus is usually on the relative merits of various contract arrangements (Beggs, 
1992; Kamien, 1992; Antelo, 2013); the effects of adverse selection and signaling on the 
number of licenses granted are generally overlooked. Schmitz (2002) builds an adverse 
selection model,1 where the licensee is better informed (than is the licensor) about the 
innovation’s value, and examines the consequences of this asymmetric information for the 
number of licenses granted. He shows that, in some states of the world, an efficient 
mechanism involves granting two licenses instead of only one. Our results complement this 
finding in that we consider a signaling framework where the licensee(s) can use period-1 
production level to signal innovation value as a means to minimizing the period-2 fee. We 
find that, compared with the case of incomplete but symmetric information, the patent holder 
under asymmetric information is more likely to prefer the competition of two licensees in 
order to countervail such opportunistic behavior on their part.  
We remark that, in Schmitz’s framework, more licenses need not imply more competition in 
the downstream market because there is always the possibility that a licensee will fail to 
develop the innovation into a new product. Absent that possibility, the patent holder has no 
incentive to grant more than one license. Our approach differs from that of Schmitz’s because 
we incorporate signaling and assume that each licensee is a successful producer. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the model while Section 2 
presents the main results under symmetric and asymmetric information. Section 4 concludes 
and proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
2. The model 
We take the case of an upstream patent holder licensing an invention that will become 
worthless after two production periods. Having no production capacity, the patent holder is 
obliged to license the invention to users capable of using it to manufacture a product. The 
market demand for such a product in each period t	 (t	ൌ	1,	2) is public information and is 
given by 
݌௧ ൌ ൜1 െ ݍ௧ if	ݍ௧ ൏ 1,0 if	ݍ௧ ൒ 1;                                                 (1) 
                                                            
1 Schmitz (2007) undertakes a similar analysis in a moral hazard setting. 
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where tq  denotes total output produced by one or two firms ሺ ሻ A Bt t tq q q  depending on the 
number of licenses granted by the patent holder. In the case of two licenses, the licensees 
compete à la Cournot. 
The marginal cost of production of a licensee, or the innovation’s value, is known only to the 
licensee; other players (i.e., the patent holder and perhaps a second licensee) have only a prior 
assessment of such cost or value. In particular, the marginal cost of production is represented 
by an independent random variable %c  such that 
ܿ̃ ൌ ൜0 with	probability	ߤ,ܿ with	probability	1 െ ߤ,                                          (2) 
where  0	൏	μ	൏	1.2 Throughout the paper we assume that 0	൏	c	൏	0.5, so that the existence of 
an equilibrium with positive production by both users is always possible irrespective of their 
cost type and any party’s beliefs about those costs. Finally, we assume that all players are risk 
neutral and there is no factor discount on profits achieved by each user.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Symmetric information 
If the value of the innovation is uncertain but information about that value is symmetric at the 
licensing game’s beginning, then the optimal allocation of the innovation can be formalized 
as follows. 
Proposition 1. Under symmetric information, it is optimal for the patent holder to grant one 
license if parameters   and 	c  satisfy 1 ሺ1 ሻ ሾ2 ሺ1 32 ሻ ሿ 0     c c . Otherwise, the patent 
holder should grant two licenses (i.e., enable creation of a duopoly). 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 1 is based on the trade-off between two effects that arise in the licensing process: 
the rent dissipation effect and the sampling effect. Under the rent dissipation effect, more 
licenses reduce each licensee’s benefits and hence the patent holder’s income. Moreover, this 
effect increases as the production costs of individual licensees converge because market 
                                                            
2 The same results would follow if we assumed the uncertainty to lie rather in the size of market demand. 
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competition is then even fiercer. The sampling effect refers to the increased likelihood of 
there being low-cost users—and thus higher profits for licensee and patent holder both, under 
our assumed payment scheme—when more licenses are granted. 
3.2. Asymmetric information and signaling 
We now assume that each licensee has private information about its own production cost, 
which is known with certainty.3 Prior to period-1 production, both the patent holder and the 
competitor (if any) know only that this production cost is a random variable given by 
equation (2). These parties can also observe, at the end of period 1, the licensee’s production 
in period 1 and then use that information (and Bayes’ rule) to update their beliefs about the 
production cost. As in Antelo (2013), the patent holder offers one-period contracts to either 
one or two licensees at the beginning of period 1 in exchange for a payment based on 
expected profits. After observing the period-1 production of each licensee, the patent holder 
then offers another contract (at the start of period 2) in exchange for a different payment. 
Note that it is suboptimal for the patent holder to offer a two-period contract at the start of 
period 1, since that would preclude using first-period production as a signal to identify 
licensee type. 
Because the patent holder cannot distinguish among licensee types before observing the 
period-1 production, payment under the first licensing agreement is not a function of type. 
After observing the first-period production, however, the patent holder can craft a second-
period licensing agreement whose payment stipulations reflect the production data. This setup 
leads to a signaling game in which users (the licensees) have incentives to behave 
opportunistically. 
We show in Lemma 1 that a single user has a vertical incentive to be perceived as inefficient 
by the patent holder in order to pay less for the renewal of the license in period 2; hence also 
a truly inefficient producer has an incentive to signal its high production cost. 
 
Lemma 1. If the patent holder grants a single license, then in the separating equilibrium of 
least cost the inefficient user’s first-period production is lower than it would be if information 
were symmetric in order to signal that the innovation is of low value. 
                                                            
3 This assumption is intended to capture a common situation: the patent holder remains largely unaware of the 
innovation’s downstream development; the licensee, with more experience in the field, is better positioned to 
recognize the innovation’s true value. 
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Proof. See Appendix. 
 
In order to be perceived as inefficient by the patent holder, an inefficient producer needs to 
produce less than it would under symmetric information in order to guarantee that an efficient 
producer does not find it profitable to behave likewise. Of course, the first-period 
informational rents of an inefficient producer are zero. Yet those of an efficient producer are 
positive, and they are higher the lower is the inefficient firm’s production. 
 
Our next lemma proves that the patent holder can counteract licensees’ opportunistic 
behavior (i.e., informational rents of efficient users) by granting two licenses, although doing 
so does not eliminate the inefficient producer’s incentive to signal its (high) costs. 
 
Lemma 2. If the patent holder grants two licenses, then the following statements hold. 
(i) The incentive of each user to be perceived (by the patent holder) as an inefficient user 
remains but is less than under the single-license scenario. 
(ii) There is a separating equilibrium of least cost where period-1 production for each 
inefficient user is lower than under symmetric information. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 are used to prove Proposition 2, which—in combination with Proposition 
1—allows us to claim that the patent holder prefers granting two licenses in some regions of 
the (μ, c)-space where a single license would be sold under symmetric information. 
Proposition 2. In the separating equilibrium of least cost, it is optimal for the patent holder 
to grant two licenses if PH PH	 , DD MME E  where PH DDE  and PHMME  are as given in Appendix by 
equations (A.27) and (A.29), respectively. Otherwise, a single license is granted. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that competition between license users leads to an increase in period-1 
production of each licensee in order to increase its period-2 market share; as a result 
competition becomes more attractive to the patent holder. On one hand, when the probability 
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μ of having efficient users is high enough, vertical incentives for efficient users to be seen as 
inefficient are low because the license fee tends to be high in any case. Furthermore, vertical 
incentives for inefficient users to signal their inefficiency are increasing in μ. Therefore, if the 
probability of efficient users is high then the patent holder has less need to discourage 
efficiency misrepresentation and so is less likely to prefer a duopoly. On the other hand, the 
lower is the production cost ܿ, the greater is the difference between monopoly and duopoly 
profits; this  effect reduces the advantages of a duopoly from the patent holder’s perspective. 
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 leads to the following result. 
Proposition 3. Granting two licenses is more likely to occur under asymmetric information 
than under symmetric information. 
Figure 1 illustrates this finding. The plots reveal that, overall, asymmetric information widens 
the range of parameters for which two licenses result in equilibrium.  
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. The monopolist’s per-period level of profit-maximizing production 
in the downstream market is  
 ݍ௧ ൌ ቐ
ଵ
ଶ if	ܿ̃ ൌ 0,
ଵି௖
ଶ if	ܿ̃ ൌ ܿ.
 (A.1) 
Therefore, the patent holder’s expected profits (i.e., the license fee) from a single two-period 
license are equal to the licensee’s expected profits: 
 ܧߨெெ୔ୌ ൌ ଵଶ ൫1 െ ሺ1 െ ߤሻܿሺ2 െ ܿሻ൯. (A.2) 
If the patent holder instead grants two licenses lasting two periods each, then the result is a 
duopoly in the downstream market and the two licensees engage in Cournot competition. The 
profit-maximizing production level for each firm i,	j	ൌ	A,	B  in period t	ൌ	1,	2 is 
 ݍ௜௧ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ଵ
ଷ if	൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ሺ0,0ሻ,
ଵା௖
ଷ if	൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ሺ0, ܿሻ,
ଵିଶ௖
ଷ if	൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ሺܿ, 0ሻ,
ଵି௖
ଷ if	൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ሺܿ, ܿሻ,
 (A.3) 
and the patent holder’s two-period expected profits are 
 ܧߨ஽஽௉ு ൌ ସଽ ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߤሻܿሾ2 െ ሺ1 ൅ 4ߤሻܿሿሻ. (A.4) 
The statement of the proposition follows after comparing equations (A.2) and (A.4). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Let  ݒଶ௅ሺܿ̃ሻ denote the licensee’s second-period monopoly profits in the 
downstream market, where ܿ̃ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. Given the per-period profit-maximizing quantities 
stipulated in (A.1), we have 
 ݒଶ௅ሺܿ̃ሻ ൌ ቐ
ଵ
ସ if	ܿ̃ ൌ 0,
ሺଵି௖ሻమ
ସ if	ܿ̃ ൌ ܿ.
 (A.5) 
Let ߨଶ௅ሺܿ̃/ܿ̃௕ሻ ൌ ݒଶ௅ሺܿ̃ሻ െ ଶ݂ሺܿ̃௕ሻ denote second-period monopoly profits net of license fee, 
where ݒଶ௅ሺܿ̃ሻ is given by (A.5), ଶ݂ሺܿ̃௕ሻ ൌ ݒଶ௅ሺܿ̃௕ሻ is the license fee, and ܿ̃, ܿ̃௕ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ are, 
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respectively, licensee’s production costs and patent holder beliefs (b) about them. These 
profits are given by 
 ߨଶ௅ሺܿ̃/ܿ̃௕ሻ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ௖ሺଶି௖ሻସ if	ܿ̃ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௕ ൌ ܿ,
0 if	ܿ̃ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௕ ൌ 0,
0 if	ܿ̃ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௕ ൌ ܿ,
െ ௖ሺଶି௖ሻସ if	ܿ̃ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௕ ൌ 0.
 (A.6) 
From (A.6) it is clear that ߨଶ௅ሺܿ̃/ܿሻ ൒ ߨଶ௅ሺܿ̃/0ሻ for all ܿ̃ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ, which means that licensees 
would prefer being perceived as inefficient. In a separating equilibrium, the efficient licensee 
is charged the highest possible fee in the second period. A costly signal of her low cost is 
therefore of no use to her and so she produces the profit-maximizing quantity in every period, 
ݍଵሺ0ሻ ൌ ݍଶሺ0ሻ ൌ ଵଶ; thus ݒଶ௅ሺ0ሻ ൌ
ଵ
ସ and ߨଶ௅ሺ0/0ሻ ൌ 0 (for ease of exposition, we refer to the 
efficient and inefficient licensees as “she” and “he”, respectively). The inefficient licensee 
can pay a lower fee if he uses his first-period production, ݍଵሺܿሻ, to signal low efficiency. This 
licensee would then be charged a fee that allows him to earn zero net profits also in the 
second period, ߨଶ௅ሺܿ/ܿሻ ൌ 0. For there to be an equilibrium, each licensee’s incentive 
compatibility constraint must be verified. The inefficient producer’s profits computed over 
two periods under signaling must be no less than his profits from paying the fee that an 
efficient licensee is charged and sending no signal—that is, from producing profit-
maximizing quantities in both periods: 
 ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵሺܿሻ൯ݍଵሺܿሻ ൅ ߨଶ௅ሺܿ/ܿሻ ൒ ሺଵି௖ሻ
మ
ସ െ
௖ሺଶି௖ሻ
ସ . (A.7) 
For the efficient licensee, profits from sending no signal must be no less than paying the fee 
that an inefficient licensee is charged and sending a signal: 
 	ଵସ ൅ ߨଶ௅ሺ0/0ሻ ൒ ൫1 െ ݍଵሺܿሻ൯ݍଵሺܿሻ ൅
௖ሺଶି௖ሻ
ସ . (A.8) 
In a separating equilibrium with signaling, the patent holder can charge different fees to each 
licensee that match the corresponding benefits, from which it follows that ߨଶ௅ሺ0/0ሻ ൌ
ߨଶ௅ሺܿ/ܿሻ ൌ 0. The value of ݍଵሺܿሻ that maximizes the inefficient licensee’s profits and verifies 
constraints (A.7) and (A.8)—the former with strict inequality—is ݍଵ௦ሺܿሻ ൌ ଵଶ െ
ඥ௖ሺଶି௖ሻ
ଶ . Hence 
the efficient licensee produces ݍଵሺ0ሻ ൌ ଵଶ, which coincides with her production under 
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complete information; the inefficient licensee produces a lower quantity than under complete 
information, ݍଵ௦ሺܿሻ ൌ ଵଶ െ
ඥ௖ሺଶି௖ሻ
ଶ ൏
ଵି௖
ଶ , to signal his high production cost. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof proceeds in two steps. We first show that licensees’ incentives 
to be perceived as inefficient by the patent holder dominate their incentives to be seen as 
efficient by a rival. Then we prove the existence of a separating equilibrium with signaling. 
Step 1. Each firm has an incentive to be perceived as efficient by its rival. We can use 
ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ to denote firm i’s profit in period 2; here i,	j	=	A,	B when the two firms compete à la 
Cournot in the downstream market and  ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ denote the production costs for firm i 
and firm j (respectively), which are common knowledge. Then 
 ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ
ଵ
ଽ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0,
ሺଵା௖ሻమ
ଽ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ,
ሺଵିଶ௖ሻమ
ଽ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0,
െ ሺଵି௖ሻమଽ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ.
 (A.9) 
We shall now denote firm i’s profit in period 2 as ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃௝௕, ܿ̃௝൯, where ܿ̃௜ and ܿ̃௝ are (as 
before) the production costs for i and j and where ܿ̃௝௕ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ denotes firm j’s beliefs about 
firm i’s production costs. When the rival’s beliefs are not correct, it is easy to check that  
ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃௝௕, ܿ̃௝൯ is given by 
ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃௝௕, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ሺଶି௖ሻ
మ
ଷ଺ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0, ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ ܿ,
ሺଶା௖ሻమ
ଷ଺ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0, ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ ܿ,
ሺଶିଷ௖ሻమ
ଷ଺ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ, ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ 0,
ሺଶି௖ሻమ
ଷ଺ if	ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ, ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ 0.
                (A.10) 
If j’s beliefs about i’s costs are correct then firm i’s profits coincide with common 
knowledge, ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯, and are given by (A.9). It can then be easily 
checked that, for ܿ̃௝ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ, we have ݒଶ௜ ൫0/ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൏ ݒଶ௜ ൫0, ܿ̃௝൯ and ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ/0, ܿ̃௝൯ ൐ ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯; 
this shows that each firm has horizontal incentives to be perceived as an efficient producer. 
Next we show that each firm has an incentive to be perceived as inefficient by the patent 
holder. Licensees’ second-period net profits are given by ߨଶ௜ ൌ ݒଶ௜ െ ଶ݂௜, where ଶ݂௜ denotes the 
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fixed fee that the patent holder charges to firm i in period 2. If there is common knowledge 
then ଶ݂௜൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯, so ߨଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ 0 for all ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. In the absence of common 
knowledge, however, license fees depend on the patent holder’s beliefs about licensee 
production costs. We denote the patent holder’s beliefs about firm i’s production cost as 
ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. Then the license fee is given by 
 ଶ݂௜൫ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ , ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓሺଵିଶ௖ሻ
మ
ଽ if		ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0,
ሺଵି௖ሻమ
ଽ if		ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ൌ ܿ		and	ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ,
ଵ
ଽ if		ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ൌ 0	and		ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0,
ሺଵା௖ሻమ
ଽ if		ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ൌ 0	and		ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ;
 (A.11) 
here we can see that ଶ݂௜൫ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൏ ଶ݂௜൫0, ܿ̃௝൯, which means that the licensee prefers to be 
perceived as inefficient by the patent holder. 
Finally, we prove that vertical incentives to be seen as inefficient dominate horizontal 
incentives to be seen as efficient. Since both the patent holder and the rival have the same 
information and since both parties update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, it follows 
that their beliefs must match: ܿ̃୔ୌ௕ ൌ ܿ̃௝௕ ൌ ܿ̃ି௜௕ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. Thus 
ߨଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿି௜௕ , ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ݒଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃ି௜௕ , ܿ̃௝൯ െ ଶ݂௜൫ܿ̃ି௜௕ , ܿ̃௝൯. 
Given this equality, we can combine (A.10) and (A.11) to obtain 
ߨଶ௜ ൫ܿ̃௜/ܿ̃ି௜௕ , ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ ௖ሺସିହ௖ሻଵଶ if			ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0, ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃ି௜௕ ൌ ܿ,
௖ሺସି௖ሻ
ଵଶ if			ܿ̃௜ ൌ 0, ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃ି௜௕ ൌ ܿ,
െ ௖ሺସିଷ௖ሻଵଶ if			ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ, ܿ̃௝ ൌ 0	and	ܿ̃ି௜௕ ൌ 0,
െ ௖ሺସା௖ሻଵଶ if			ܿ̃௜ ൌ ܿ, ܿ̃௝ ൌ ܿ	and	ܿ̃ି௜௕ ൌ 0.
             (A.12) 
In (A.12) it can be checked that ߨଶ௜ ൫0/ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൐ ߨଶ௜ ൫0, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ 0 and ߨଶ௜ ൫ܿ/0, ܿ̃௝൯ ൏ ߨଶ௜ ൫ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ 0 
for ܿ̃௝ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. This proves that every licensee prefers being perceived as inefficient because 
vertical incentives are the dominant ones. 
Step 2. Let the index ݅௖̃ ∈ ሼܣ௖̃, ܤ௖̃ሽ denote firm i with production cost ܿ̃ ∈ ሼ0, ܿሽ. Let ݍଵೞ௜೎෤  and 
ݍଵ௜೎෤  denote, respectively, the signaling and nonsignaling first-period production of firm ݅௖̃. We 
shall prove that, in a separating equilibrium, it is optimal for (a) an efficient licensee to pay 
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the high fee and do not  send a costly signal and (b) an inefficient licensee to signal his high 
cost (and thus be charged a lower fee in period 2). 
(a) An efficient firm ݅଴ sending no signal in the first period seeks to solve the following 
problem: 
 max௤భ೔బ ܧݒଵ
௜బ൫0, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ max௤భ೔బൣ1 െ ݍଵ
௜బ െ ൫ߤݍଵ௝బ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻݍଵೞ௝೎൯൧ݍଵ௜బ, (A.13) 
where ݆଴ ∈ ሼܣ଴, ܤ଴ሽ,  ௖݆ ∈ ሼܣ௖, ܤ௖ሽ. The solution is 
 ݍଵ௜బ ൌ
ଵିሺଵିఓሻ௤భೞ
ೕ೎
ଶାఓ . (A.14) 
(b) An inefficient firm ݅௖ that does not signal high-cost production (assuming that other 
players do not change their equilibrium behavior) seeks to solve 
 max௤భ೔೎ ܧݒଵ
௜೎൫ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ max௤భ೔೎ൣ1 െ ݍଵ
௜೎ െ ൫ߤݍଵ௝బ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻݍଵೞ௝೎൯ െ ܿ൧ݍଵ௜೎ ; (A.15) 
the solution to this problem is 
 ݍଵ௜೎ ൌ
ଶሺଵି௖ሻିఓ௖ିଶሺଵିఓሻ௤భೞ
ೕ೎
ଶሺଶାఓሻ . (A.16) 
Finally, a separating equilibrium requires that the following two incentive compatibility 
constraints be verified: 
● If firm’s cost is low, then 
ߤ൫1 െ ݍଵ௜బ െ ݍଵ௝బ൯ݍଵ௜బ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ൫1 െ ݍଵ௜బ െ ݍଵೞ௝೎൯ݍଵ௜బ ൒ ߤ ቂ൫1 െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵ௝బ൯ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൅
௖ሺସିହ௖ሻ
ଵଶ ቃ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߤሻ ቂ൫1 െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵೞ௝೎൯ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൅
௖ሺସି௖ሻ
ଵଶ ቃ,             (A.17) 
that is, the efficient licensee prefers to produce her nonsignaling expected profit-
maximizing output, in which case her second-period profits will be zero after 
deducting the license fee charged to an efficient firm, rather than to produce the 
signaling output and hence pay the license fee charged to an inefficient firm—namely, 
the fee given by the first two rows of (A.11)—and thus to earn the corresponding 
second-period net profits, which are given by the first two rows of (A.12). 
● If firm’s cost is high, then 
ߤ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵ௝బ൯ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵೞ௝೎൯ݍଵೞ௜೎  
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൒ ߤ ቂ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵ௜೎ െ ݍଵ௝బ൯ݍଵ௜೎ െ ௖ሺସିଷ௖ሻଵଶ ቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ ቂ൫1െܿ െ ݍଵ
௜೎ െ ݍଵೞ௝೎൯ݍଵ௜೎ െ
௖ሺସା௖ሻ
ଵଶ ቃ ;	(A.18) 
in this case, the inefficient licensee prefers to produce his signaling expected profit-
maximizing output, in which case his second-period profits will be zero after 
deducting the license fee charged to an inefficient firm, rather than to produce the 
non-signaling output and hence pay the license fee charged to an efficient firm—
namely, the fee given by the last two rows of (A.11)—and thus to earn the 
corresponding second-period net profits, which are given by the last two rows of 
(A.12). 
 
Solving (A.17) and (A.18) as equalities and then using (A.14) and (A.16), we obtain 
 ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൌ
ଵ
ଷ േ
ሺଶାఓሻඥଷሾସ௖ିሺଵାସఓሻ௖మሿ
ଵ଼ , (A.19) 
 ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൌ
ଵି௖
ଷ െ
ఓ௖
଺ േ
ሺଶାఓሻඥଷሾସ௖ାሺଵିସఓሻ௖మሿ
ଵ଼ . (A.20) 
The negative root in (A.20) is the lowest value (corresponding to the least production), 
followed by the negative root in (A.19), the positive root in (A.20), and finally the positive 
root in (A.19). 
The unconstrained profit-maximizing production for the inefficient producer solves the 
following problem: 
 max௤భೠ೙೔೎ ܧݒଵ
௜೎൫ܿ, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ max௤భೠ೙೔೎ ൣ1 െ ݍଵೠ೙
௜೎ െ ൫ߤݍଵೠ೙௝బ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻݍଵೠ೙௝೎ ൯ െ ܿ൧ݍଵೠ೙௜೎ . (A.21) 
The solution for a Cournot equilibrium is 
 ݍଵೠ೙௜೎ ൌ
ଵ
ଷ െ
ሺଶାఓሻ௖
଺ . (A.22) 
A separating equilibrium requires the inefficient firm to choose—in a way that maximizes 
profits—between production as given by (A.19) and as given by (A.20). It can easily be 
verified that 
ଵ
ଷ െ
ሺଶାఓሻඥଷሾସ௖ିሺଵାସఓሻ௖మሿ
ଵ଼ ൏
ଵ
ଷ െ
ሺଶାఓሻ௖
଺ ൏
ଵି௖
ଷ െ
ఓ௖
଺ ൅
ሺଶାఓሻඥଷሾସ௖ାሺଵିସఓሻ௖మሿ
ଵ଼ .        (A.23) 
The positive root in (A.20) does not verify inequality (A.17), yet the negative root in (A.19) 
does verify (A.17) with equality and (A.18) with strict inequality. So in a separating 
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equilibrium, the inefficient firm chooses a level of production given by the negative root in 
(A.19) and, by (A.14), the efficient firm chooses 
 ݍଵ௜బ ൌ ଵଷ ൅
ሺଵିఓሻඥଷሾସିሺଵାସఓሻ௖ሿ௖
ଵ଼ . (A.24) 
It follows from (A.23) that the inefficient firm’s equilibrium production under signaling is 
lower than the unconstrained equilibrium production characterized by (A.22). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
(i) One license. We start by computing the first-period patent fee, which we denote by ଵ݂ሺܿ̃ሻ 
in the monopoly case. Because the patent holder has no information about licensee costs, 
there can be only one license fee; that fee is set equal to the firm’s profits according as 
whether it is efficient or inefficient. Yet in a signaling equilibrium the fee charged must equal 
the inefficient firm’s profits, for otherwise that firm would have negative profits. Therefore, 
ଵ݂	ሺܿ̃ሻ ൌ ଵ݂ሺܿሻ ൌ ݒଵ௅ሺܿሻ. Taking ݍଵ௦ሺܿሻ from Lemma 1 now yields 
 ଵ݂ሺܿሻ ൌ ݒଵ௅ሺܿሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵ௦ሺܿሻ	ሻݍଵ௦ሺܿሻ 	ൌ ଵସ ቀ1 െ 4ܿ ൅ ܿଶ ൅ 2ܿඥܿሺ2 െ ܿሻቁ, (A.25) 
and first-period licensee profits are ߨଵ௅ሺܿሻ ൌ ݒଵ௅ሺܿሻെ ଵ݂ሺܿሻ ൌ 0; for the efficient firm, 
ߨଵ௅ሺ0ሻ ൌ ݒଵ௅ሺ0ሻ െ ଵ݂ሺܿሻ. Using the quantity produced, ݍଵሺ0ሻ, from Lemma 1 yields ݒଵ௅ሺ0ሻ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ݍଵሺ0ሻ	ሻݍଵሺ0ሻ 	ൌ ଵସ. After accounting for the license fee given by (A.25), we obtain 
 ߨଵ௅ሺ0ሻ ൌ ௖ସ ቀ4 െ ܿ െ 2ඥܿሺ2 െ ܿሻቁ. (A.26) 
From (A.26) it follows that ߨଵ௅ሺ0ሻ ൐ 0, which shows that the efficient firm earns 
informational rents in the first period. 
When it grants only one license, the patent holder’s expected profits are 
 ܧߨெெ୔ୌ ൌ ݒଵ௅ሺܿሻ ൅ ߤ	ݒଶ௅ሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻݒଶ௅ሺܿሻ, (A.27) 
where ݒଵ௅ሺܿሻ, ݒଶ௅ሺ0ሻ and ݒଶ௅ሺܿሻ are as given by (A.25) and (A.5). 
(ii) Two licenses. Again we start by computing the first-period license fee. As in the 
monopoly case, the patent holder has no information about the licensees type. So in order to 
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verify the participation constraint for both firms, the patent holder must set a fee equal to an 
inefficient firm’s expected profits; doing so makes the first-period expected profits (net of the 
license fee) equal to zero for that firm type and, at the same time, gives positive informational 
rents to a firm of the efficient type. Note that a higher fee would violate the inefficient firm’s 
participation constraint. For ଵ݂௜൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯, the first-period license fee, our previous reasoning 
implies that ଵ݂௜൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ଵ݂௝൫ܿ̃௜, ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ଵ݂௜൫ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ଵ݂௝ሺܿ̃௜ሻ and hence that this fee is given by 
 ଵ݂௜൫ܿ̃௝൯ ൌ ߤ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵ௝బ൯ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ൫1 െ ܿ െ ݍଵೞ௜೎ െ ݍଵೞ௝೎൯ݍଵೞ௜೎ ; (A.28) 
here ݍଵೞ௜೎ ൌ ݍଵೞ௝೎ and ݍଵ௝బ ൌ ݍଵ௜బ, equalities that are given by the negative root in (A.19) and (A.24), 
respectively. 
In the duopoly case, the patent holder’s expected profits are 
ܧߨ஽஽୔ୌ ൌ 2 ቀߤ	ݒଵ௜ሺܿ, 0ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ	ݒଵ௜ሺܿ, ܿሻቁ ൅ 2 ൬ߤଶݒଶ௜ ሺ0,0ሻ ൅ ߤሺ1 െ ߤሻ ቀݒଶ௜ ሺ0, ܿሻ ൅
ݒଶ௜ ሺܿ, 0ሻቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻଶݒଶ௜ ሺܿ, ܿሻ൰.          (A.29) 
In (A.29), the first- and second-period profits are given by (A.28) and (A.9), respectively. In 
a separating equilibrium with two licenses, second-period profits coincide with those of a 
Cournot equilibrium with symmetric information, which are given by (A.9). 
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